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1. Lisa A Rickard, Delaware Flirts with Encouraging Shareholder Lawsuits, WALL 
ST. J. (Nov. 14, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/lisa-rickard-delaware-flirts-with-encour 
aging-shareholder-lawsuits-1416005328, 
2. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS-2013 YEAR IN 
REVIEW 1 (2014), available at https://www.cornerstone.com/GetAttachment/d88bd527-
25b5-4c54-8d 40-2b 13da0d0779/Securities-Class-Action -Filings-2013-Y ear-in-Review. pdf. 
While there has been a decline in the number of filings in recent years, there was an in-
crease in the number of filings from 2012 to 2013. Id. 
3. Id. at 1, 7. 
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). 
5. Class Action: An Overview, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/ 
class_action (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
6. See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. 
7. SEC. EXCH. CoMM'N, How CAN INVESTORS GET MONEY BACK IN A FRAUD CASE 
INVOLVING A VIOh'\TION OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS?, http://www.sec.gov/answers 
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move. The idea behmd a gambit is 
strategically sacrifice one of pieces, typically a pawn, 
to gain an advantage later on the 
proposes that, light of recent decisions 
the United States Supreme 
/recoverfunds.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
8. See infra Part III; U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, ECONOMIC 
CONSEQUENCES: THE REAL COSTS OF U.S. SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 5-6 (Feb. 
2014). 
9. The corporation's sacrifice is explained as a double-edged sword due to the poten-
tial effects on discovery at the class certification stage. See infra Part I.C. 
10. Investing in stock is not risk free. The risk analysis of stock investing is outside 
the scope of this article. The point here is that if corporations are not burdened by heavy 
litigation costs, presumably the corporation will be able to invest those savings in other 
areas, which would hopefully add value to the company and ultimately increase the value 
of the shareholder's stock. See infra Part I.C. 
11. See infra Part II.B.i (identifying the corporate contract doctrine); Part II.C (identi-
fying policy concerns related to federal preemption). 
12. From 2006 to 2010, 40% of securities class action suits settled, 32% were dis-
missed with prejudice, 11 % were voluntarily dropped, leaving only 18% of cases moving 
forward. Michael Klausner, Jason Hegland & Matthew Goforth, VVhen Are Securities Class 
Actions Dismissed, VVhen Do They Settle, and For How Much? An Update, 26 PROF. 
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LIABILITY UNDERWRITING Soc'Y J. 1 fig. 1 (photo. reprint 2013) (2013), available at http: 
//securities.stanford.edu/academic-articles/20130101-when-securities-class-actions-dismiss 
ed-when-settle-for-how-much. pdf. 
13. Daniel Fisher, Study Shows Consumer Class-Action Lawyers Earn Millions, Cli-
ents Little, FORBES (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2013/12/ll/ 
with-consumer-class-actions-lawyers-are-mostly-paid-to-do-nothing/. 
14. 485 U.S. 224 (1988); see infra Part I.A 
15. See infra Part I.A 
16. See infra Part I.C. 
17. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 247. 
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settling before trial (before or during the class 
At this point, should the case be dismissed, 
should not be liable for paying the plaintiffs' 
shifting fees to the plaintiffs if they do not 
extent),18 plaintiffs will need to put their money 
mouths are. On the other hand, with the increased 
ery requirements, both parties and the court will be more aware 
actual fraud and damage that took place, if any, which 
lead to a more definitive compensation figure 
acts. 
I discusses the current landscape of securities class 
It explains how and why the suits are initiated and 
outcome of Halliburton Co. v. Erica John 
19 Part discusses the framework for the proposi-
this comment. It provides a brief history of significant cas-
incorporates several recent cases that have opened 
to possibility of implementing fee-shifting clauses. 
with a comparison to other contractual provisions cur-
implemented by corporations and also analyzes 
provisions under federal preemption. Part 
implementing fee-shifting provisions solves many of the 
concerns raised by Halliburton II. Part IV discusses several im-
and possible future actions that are readily 
regarding fee-shifting provisions. 
I. CURRENT LANDSCAPE OF SHAREHOLDER SECURITIES 
LITIGATION 
plaintiffs can bring suits alleging various violations 
laws,20 the scope of this comment is focused on 
a lOb-5 violation. Further limiting the scope of 
proposed solution is aimed at affecting class 
claims in which the plaintiffs are attempting class cer-
HH'-'a~wu based on a "fraud-on-the-market" ("FOM") presumption 
The development of the fraud-on-the-market 
18. See infra Part III. 
19. 573 U.S._, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014); see infra Part I. 
20. Such other claims deal with mergers and acquisitions, Chinese Reverse Mergers, 
and violations of other sections of federal and state securities laws. See CORNERSTONE 
RESEARCH, supra note 2, at 7 fig. 6 (listing numerous kinds of allegations). 
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reliance and its effect on securities litigation are the subjects 
part. It explains the current debate on the impact of pre-
sumption and concludes with an analysis of the recent Supreme 
Court decision in Halliburton II. 
A Section IO(b) and Fraud-on-the-Market Presumption of 
Reliance 
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 ("'34 Act") created 
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") to help enforce a 
newly enacted regime of federal securities laws. 21 Under the au-
thority of section lO(b) of the '34 Act, the SEC issued Rule lOb-5 
("lOb-5"), an anti-fraud provision that covered both the purchase 
and sale of securities. 22 While there is no express private right of 
action contained in the statutes or rules, the Supreme Court has 
recognized an implied private right of action for lOb-5 violations 
since 1946.23 
One of the elements that plaintiffs must prove in order to re-
cover damages under lOb-5 claims is reliance, 24 which is the most 
relevant element to this comment. Essentially, plaintiffs must 
prove that the defendant made a material misrepresentation or 
omission on which the plaintiff relied in deciding to purchase or 
sell securities.25 Proof of reliance is fundamental to the court's 
analysis because it "provides the requisite causal connection be-
tween a defendant's misrepresentation and a plaintiffs injury."26 
The Supreme Court, in Basic Inc. v. Levinson ("Basic"), recog-
nized that requiring individual proof of direct reliance from every 
21. Steven A Ramirez, The Virtues of Private Securities Litigation: An Historic and 
Macroeconomic Perspective, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 669, 681 (2014). A year prior to the en-
actment of the '34 Act, the Securities Act of 1933 was enacted, requiring full disclosure of 
initial securities distributions. Id. at 670, 680-81. 
22. General Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 240 C.F.R. § 
240. lOb-5 (2014); see Ramirez, supra note 21, at 681-82. 
23. See Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946). In 2007, 
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makar Issues & Rights, Ltd., 
began the opinion by stating, "This Court has long recognized that meritorious private ac-
tions to enforce federal antifraud securities laws are an essential supplement to criminal 
prosecutions and civil enforcement actions brought, respectively, by the Department of 
Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission." 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007). 
24. Halliburton II, 573 U.S. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2407 (citing Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. 
Plans & Trust Funds, 568 U.S._,_, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1191-92 (2013)). 
25. Id. 
26. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988). 
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27. Id. at 242. Class certification is not proper when individual questions of law or fact 
predominate over questions of law or fact common to the class. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
28. Basic, 485 U.S. at 245-46. 
29. Id. A common example would be the S&P 500. FOM incorporates the "efficient 
market hypothesis," a topic that is outside the scope of this comment. It is worth noting 
that whether markets are efficient or not is currently debated and further supported by 
empirical data. See generally Bradford Cornell & James C. Rutten, Market Efficiency, 
Crashes, and Securities Litigation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 443 (2006) (proposing a standard for 
efficiency and weighing that standard against others). 
30. Basic, 485 U.S. at 246-47. 
31. Id. 
32. Halliburton II, 573 U.S. _, _, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2408 (2014). 
33. Basic, 485 U.S. at 248. 
34. Halliburton II, .573 U.S. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2416. 
35. See Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 
WIS. L. REV. 151, 152-53 ("Tens of billions of dollars have changed hands in settlements of 
lOb-5 lawsuits in the last twenty years as a result of Basic."). 
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36. Id. at 153; see also Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble with Basic: Price Distortion After 
Halliburton, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 895, 896 (2013). 
37. Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995: Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs, Defend-
ants and Lawyers, 51 Bus. LAW. 1009, 1011-12 (1996) [hereinafter Rebalancing Litigation 
Risks]. 
38. See id. at 1012. 
39. Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. 
!LL. L. REV. 913, 921. 
40. Id. at 914; see Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 
Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
41. Perino, supra note 39, at 914. 
42. U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 8, at 5. 
43. Id. 
44. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 
Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Cecilia A. Glass, Sword or 
Shield? Setting Limits on SLUSA's Ever-Growing Reach, 63 DUKE L.J. 1337, 1338 (2014). 
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The purpose of this act was to prevent circumvention the re-
cently created PSLRA by requiring lOb-5 
claims to file in federal court. 45 But as the data above shows, lOb-
5 claims are still being filed, and more importantly, settling be-
fore trial. 46 
While the potential for abuse and the settlement dilemma are 
still apparent in modern litigation, defendant corporations were 
recently given a significant helping hand in rebutting the FOM 
presumption. However, the use of this helping hand is likely to 
come at a significant cost for the corporation. 
C. The Supreme Court Upholds FOM, but Provides 
Modification 
In 2014, the Supreme Court decided holding 
that defendants are allowed to offer proof against the FOM pre-
sumption at class certification.47 The Court was tasked with de-
ciding whether to overturn or modify Basic. 48 Erica Fund, 
Inc. ("EPJ") alleged that Halliburton Co. ("Halliburton") made a 
series of misrepresentations regarding the company's future deal-
ings in an effort to inflate the company's stock price. 49 EPJ assert-
ed that, in response to Halliburton's subsequent corrective disclo-
sures, the company's stock price dropped, thus to 
its shareholders. 50 EPJ then invoked the Basic presumption and 
moved to be certified as a class comprised of all the investors 
who purchased stock during the period of inflation. 51 The case 
made it to the Supreme Court twice. The first time the 
Supreme Court held that class action plaintiffs alleging securities 
fraud need not prove loss causation at the class certification stage 
order to invoke Basie's presumption. 52 Halliburton 
45. 15 U.S.C. § 77p (2012); see Halliburton II, 573 U.S. _, _, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2426 
(2014). 
46. U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 8, at 5. 
47. 573 U.S. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2417. "Basie's presumption" and the "FOM presump-
tion" are interchangeable terms. 
48. Class Actions-Presumption of Reliance Under SEC Rule 1 Ob-5-Halliburton Co. 
v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 128 HARV. L. REV. 291, 291 (2014). 
49. Halliburton II, 573 U.S. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2405. 
50. Id. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2405-06. 
51. Id. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2406. 
52. Id. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2406-07. 
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argued the evidence it previously introduced to disprove loss 
causation also disproved the misrepresentations had an im-
pact on stock price. 53 Halliburton contended that without any 
price impact, the investors would have to prove individual reli-
ance on misrepresentations and thus class certification was 
improper the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 
Rule 23(b)(3). 54 By not considering Halliburton's argument, the 
district court certified the class, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, 
stating while Halliburton's price impact evidence could be 
used at to the presumption, it could not be used at 
55 Thus, the case appeared before the Supreme 
second time-this time to address whether price 
be introduced at the class certification 
Basie's FOM presumption. 56 
ultimately decided not to overturn Basic, 57 
find that it was proper for defendants to intro-
duce "price impact" evidence at the class certification stage to re-
but presumption.58 The Court distinguished its deci-
sion recent case in which the Court held that 
securities class plaintiffs do not need to prove materiality 
at class certification. 59 The Court found "price impact" fundamen-
tal to Basie's presumption since the presumption assumes that in 
efficient markets a stock's price reflects all public information, 
eluding misrepresentations. 60 "Price impact" necessarily affects 
class Rule 23(b)(3) because "if reliance is to be 
shown the Basic presumption, the publicity and market 
efficiency prerequisites must be proved before class certification. 
53. Id. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2406. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2406-07. 
56. Id. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2407. The Court also accepted the case to reconsider Basie's 
presumption itself. Id. 
57. Id. Halliburton contended that Basic should be overruled on several grounds. Spe-
cifically, Halliburton argued that Basie's presumption: (1) conflicted with Congress's in-
tent in enacting the '34 Act; (2) relied on the markets being efficient which had been em-
pirically disproven; (3) eliminated the reliance element for lOb-5 claims and altered the 
burden of proof under Rule 23 class certification; and (4) implicated policy concerns re-
garding the amount of meritless claims, costs on shareholders, and unnecessary use of ju-
dicial resources. Id. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2408-13. 
58. Id. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2417. 
59. Id. at _, 134 S. Ct. at 2416-17; see Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust 
Funds, 568 U.S. _, _, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1202 (2013). 
60. Halliburton II, 573 U.S. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2416. 
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proof of those prerequisites, the fraud-on-the-market 
theory underlying the presumption completely collapses, render-
ing class certification inappropriate."61 So now defendants may 
traduce either direct or indirect evidence showing lack of price 
at class certification. 62 Indirect evidence would tend to 
show that the misrepresentation was publicly known or that the 
was inefficient, as opposed to direct evidence such as re-
ports showing the stock price did not change between the time 
when the misrepresentation was made and the time period after 
corrective statements were made. 63 
At the time of this writing, the effects of II have 
not come to light, but plenty of scholars lawyers have of-
fered commentary on Court's decision, revealing a mixed view 
of the results. Some say the decision was a for plaintiffs, 
others believe the opposite, still others even say the de-
will not have any effect. 64 The remainder of this section 
deals with the implications regarding the decision in 
These implications set forth the problem this comment seeks 
to resolve. 
Some commentators believe that if Halliburton appears to 
make plaintiffs' case an uphill battle, plaintiffs' lawyers will 
simply find other avenues to bring such claims.65 One such ave-
nue would be to assert the misrepresentations as omissions to in-
voke the presumption of reliance from Affiliated Ute Citizens of 
v. United States66 Depending on the facts of case, other 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2417. 
63. Id. at_, 134 S, Ct. at 2415-16. 
64. See e.g., Alison Frankel, SCOTUS Halliburton Ruling Could Backfire for Securi-
ties Defendants, REUTERS (June 23, 2014), available at http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-
frankel/2014/06/23/scotus-halliburton -ruling-could-backfire-for-securities-defendants/ (dis-
cussing the benefits and burdens for both plaintiffs and defendants); Douglas W. Greene, 
First Take on Halliburton II: The Price-Impact Rule May Not Have Much Practical Impact, 
D&O DISCOURSE (June 24, 2014), http://www.dandodiscourse.com/2014/06/24/first-take-on 
-halliburton-ii-the-price-impact-rule-may-not-have-much-practical-impact/. 
65. Greene, supra note 64. 
66. Id. The presumption of reliance for omissions created under Affiliated Ute Citizens 
of Utah v. United States may be invoked only if there is proof of fraudulent course of busi-
ness in violation of 10b-(5)(a) or (c). But the omissions must have made affirmative state-
ments false or misleading. Claire Loebs Davis, Halliburton: Is the Fix as Basic as Alleging 
Omissions Under Affiliated Ute? Or Is That Too Cute?, D&O DISCOURSE (Jan. 28, 2014), 
http://www.dandodiscourse.com/2014/0l/28/halliburton-is .. the-fix-as-basic-as-alleging-omis 
sions-under-affiliated-ute-or-is-that-too-cute/; see Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United 
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such avenues could to allege of 
67 The takeaway from these commentators 
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pact for each individual misrepresentation since 
ly use such evidence to show the existence price 
defendants are able to strip away the presumption 
misrepresentations they can prove had no on the 
12 renders certification inappropriate under 
23(b)(3) as to the specific misrepresentation because 
would be required to prove actual reliance. 73 
studies, some commentators believe, will turn 
States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972). 
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67. N.Y. CITY BAR AsS'N COMM. ON SEC. LITIG., REPORT ON THE POSSIBLE IMPACT OF 
HALLIBURTON II ON SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 80 (May 28, 2014). 
68. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 249-50 (1988). 
69. See, e.g., Halliburton II, 573 U.S._,_, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2424 (Thomas, J., concur-
ring); Brief for Former SEC Commissioners and Officials and Law Professors as Amici Cu-
riae Supporting Petitioners at 24, Halliburton II, 573 U.S._, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 
13-317) [hereinafter Brief for Former SEC Commissioners and Officials and Law Profes-
sors]. 
70. Brief for Former SEC Commissioners and Officials and Law Professors, supra 
note 69, at 22-26 (comparing the attempt of rebuttal to a game of Whack-a-Mole) . 
71. Halliburton II, 573 U.S. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2415. If the study lacked a showing of 
price impact regarding the specific misrepresentation at issue, the presumption has no 
foundation to rest upon, even if the plaintiffs "event study" showed that the market was 
efficient. See id. 
72. Aaron M. Streett & Shane Pennington, Basic Instinct: The Supreme Court Con-
fronts the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 46 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at 1883, 1886 (Sept. 
29, 2014). 
73. Id. 
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experts."74 Both parties will presumably introduce event studies 
as direct evidence of price impact or the lack thereof. A problem 
arises when experts come to different conclusions because there 
are numerous statistical tools and models that can be used to 
produce event studies. 75 This will lead to Daubert challenges re-
garding expert methodologies. 76 
thing seems certain regarding the use of event studies-
the cost of bringing and defending a securities class action claim 
increase. In regards to the price impact ruling of Halliburton 
Roberta Karmel stated, "It is unlikely this will make lOb-5 
cases less expensive, and may even prove inimical to the defeat of 
class actions, since it may allow plaintiffs additional discovery in 
class certification battles."77 Other attorneys predict that plain-
will incur higher costs to get past class certification, and the 
costs of defending such cases will certainly increase. 78 The effects 
of an increase in upfront costs seem to only favor plaintiffs. If 
plaintiffs defeat price impact defenses at the class certification 
stage, they are in a far more favorable position in post-
certification settlement negotiations. 79 Furthermore, once defend-
ants oppose class certification based on price impact, plaintiffs 
most certainly will make discovery demands on the basis of those 
defenses. 80 Again, this will potentially make the plaintiffs' cases 
stronger, or strengthen their settlement position, depending on 
information is handed over. 81 So even though defendants are 
now to rebut Basie's presumption at the class certification 
74. Id. 
75. Mark A. Perry & Jonathan C. Dickey, Eight Propositions Regarding the Scope of 
Halliburton II, 46 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (ENA) at 1403, 1406 (July 21, 2014). 
76. Id. Daubert challenges require courts to determine the reliability and relevance of 
expert testimony. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594-95 (1993). 
For an in-depth analysis of Daubert challenges pertaining to financial experts, see 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPER, DAUBERT CHALLENGES TO FINANCIAL EXPERTS: A YEARLY 
STUDY OF TRENDS AND OUTCOMES 1 (Apr. 2014), http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-
services/publications/ assets/ daubert-study-2013. pdf. 
77. Roberta S. Karmel, Attacked Again, Basic Survives, 46 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (ENA) 
at 1347, 1350 (July 14, 2014); see also M. Todd Henderson & Adam C. Pritchard, Hallibur-
ton Will Raise Cost of Securities Class Actions, LAW360 (July 2, 2014), https://www.law 
3 60. co ml articles/ 5 5 283 9/halliburton -will-raise-cost-of-securities-class-actions. 
78. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 64. 
79. Frankel, supra note 64. 
80. Id. 
81. See id. 
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stage, the possible economic consequences of such defenses 
factor into a defendant's decision to fight the claim or settle. 
1333 
The last issue of this section is the problem of 
shareholder class action suits. The problem does not stem 
Halliburton but rather from the nature of shareholder class 
action suits. The problem of circularity increases the costs 
gation implicated by Halliburton and further exacerbates 
expense problem. Circularity arises because shareholder class 
action suits, the issuer of the stock (i.e., the defendant corpora-
tion) pays the damages, either directly or through directors 
officers ("D&O") insurance.82 The consequence is that 
holders themselves are the ones who ultimately bear the cost 
such payments.83 The problem gets more intricate 
shareholder class differs from current shareholders.84 
ly, since most cases settle, the damages paid are simply a 
of wealth between investors, with attorneys getting a significant 
cut. 85 This again leads back to the "race to the courthouse" issue 
discussed above, since plaintiffs' attorneys are motivated to 
their share of the action as early and often as possible.86 
cal analysis tends to show that shareholder wealth is actually 
stroyed due to class action litigation.87 Most importantly in this 
context, after Halliburton II, the costs of litigation are going to 
increase without providing any meaningful benefit to 
ers because shareholders ultimately bear the costs. As to 
plication, M. Todd Henderson succinctly states, "Securities 
actions are a costly form of insurance against fraud, and investors 
are the ones ultimately footing the bill. Only the lawyers, 
now, the economists, are enriched."88 
The FOM presumption provides for class-wide reliance 
promotes private enforcement against securities fraud. Since the 
82. Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation, 
2009 WIS. L. REV. 333, 337. 
83. Id. For a brief explanation of the effects on shareholders, see U.S. CHAMBER INST. 
FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 8, at 5-6. 
84. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deter-
rence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1556-62 (2006). 
85. U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 8, at 5-6. 
86. See id. at 5. A more detailed analysis of the circularity problem is outside the 
scope of this comment. 
87. See id. at 6. 
88. Henderson & Pritchard, supra note 77. 
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securities class action litigation 
Several negative effects of the presump-
required legislative action judicial modifica-
Supreme denied overturning 
that would presumably help 
implications of rebutting the pre-
t-iuuuwn may in fact leave such litigation 
or make them worse. With Basic here to 
seek better ways to protect themselves 
uil;;aul.UH, which turn ultimately protect share-
PROVISIONS TAKE THE SPOTLIGHT 
section looks at contractual relationship between cor-
and shareholders the corporation's articles of 
Specifically, it focuses on fee-shifting 
transfer litigation and attorneys fees from a 
to shareholder plaintiffs under certain cir-
section discuss the recent Delaware 
case, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund,91 
sparked a debate on the implementation of fee-shifting 
attempt to govern litigation. This section then 
provisions with other contractual provisions 
currently being used by corporations. The see-
the necessary analysis of federal preemption, 
as thls comment proposes to apply private contractual agree-
ments to lOb-5 claims. 
corporation, incorpo-
operates a men's professional tennis 
of directors amended the bylaws by 
members liable for the corpora-
89. Langevoort, supra note 35, at 153. 
90. See Henderson & Pritchard, supra note 77. 
91. 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014). 
92. Id. at 555. A membership corporation is another term for a closely held corpora-
tion or "non-stock" corporation. 
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"litigation 
against the 
members 
lost at trial. 93 In 
fee-questions 
shifting facially valid, was to non-
stock corporations.99 The Delaware Supreme Court 
ther stated 
enforceable, 
the specific ATP fee-shifting bylaw is 
depends on the manner in which it was 
Id. 
93. Id. at 556. The amended bylaw reads as follows: 
(a) In the event that (i) any [current or prior member or Owner or anyone on 
their behalf ("Claiming Party")] initiates or asserts any [claim or counter-
claim ("Claim")] or joins, offers substantial assistance to or has a direct finan-
cial interest in any Claim against the League or any member or Owner (in-
cluding any Claim purportedly filed on behalf of the League or any member), 
and (ii) the Claiming Party (or the third party that received substan-
tial assistance from the Claiming Party or in whose Claim the Claiming Par-
ty had a direct financial interest) does not obtain a judgment on the merits 
that substantially achieves, in substance and amount, the full remedy 
sought, then each Claiming Party shall be obligated jointly and severally to 
reimburse the League and any such member or Owners for all fees, costs and 
expenses of every kind and description (including, but not limited to, all rea-
sonable attorneys' fees and other litigation expenses) (collectively, "Litigation 
Costs") that the parties may incur in connection with such Claim. 
94. Id. at 556. 
95. Id.; see FED. R. Crv. P. 54. 
96. ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 556. 
97. Id. at 556-57. 
98. Id. at 557. 
99. Id. at 555, 558. 
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adopted and the circumstances under which it was invoked. By-
laws that may otherwise be facially valid will not be enforced if 
adopted or used for an inequitable purpose."100 
Immediately after this decision, the Delaware legislature, 
urged on by the state plaintiffs' bar, 101 attempted to pass a law 
expressly prohibiting fee-shifting provisions in a stock corpora-
tion's articles or bylaws. 102 However, in response to protests and 
requests from business groups and corporations, the legislature 
tabled the bill to further study the matter. 103 Currently, the Dela-
ware legislature has not enacted any laws regarding fee-
shifting.104 Any future action will presumably have an effect on 
the analysis and arguments of this comment. While the holding 
in ATP Tour is clearly limited to Delaware non-stock corpora-
tions, the remainder of this section discusses the holding's possi-
ble application to stock corporations. 105 
The primary purpose of fee-shifting provisions is to impose a 
''loser pays" rule106 different from the American Rule followed by 
Delaware courts, which typically requires parties to pay their 
own litigation costs. 101 After the holding in ATP Tour, multiple 
Delaware corporations adopted such fee-shifting bylaws, and oth-
er companies have included fee-shifting provisions in their arti-
100. Id. at 558. 
101. Stephen Bainbridge, Delaware's Decision: Viewing Fee Shifting Bylaws Through a 
Public Choice Lens, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.professor 
bainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2014/11/delawares-decision-viewing-fee-shifting-
bylaws-through·a·public-choice-lens.html [hereinafter Bainbridge, Public Choice Lens]. 
102. Rickard, supra note 1. 
103. Id. 
104. At the time of this writing, the Delaware legislature had tabled the discussion of 
fee-shifting clauses. See Jonathan Starkey, Fee-Shifting Bylaw Bill Tabled Until 2015, 
DELAWAREONLINE (June 19, 2014), http://www.delawareonline.com/story/money/business 
/2014/06/19/delaware-general-assembly-tables-legal-fee-shifting-bylaw-bill/ 10946611/. 
105. For purposes of this comment, further use of the term "corporation" refers to 
"stock corporations." This comment specifically identifies any discussion of "non-stock cor-
porations." 
106. Stephen Bainbridge, The Case for Allowing Fee Shifting Bylaws as a Privately Or-
dered Solution to the Shareholder Litigation Epidemic, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Nov. 
17, 2014), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2014/11/the-case-
for-allowing·fee-shifting-bylaws-as-a-privately-ordered-solution-to-the-shareholder-litigat. 
html [hereinafter Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Solution]. 
107. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 558 (Del. 2014). Fee-
shifting closely resembles the English Rule, which requires the losing party to cover the 
winning party's litigation costs. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English 
Versus the American Rule on Attorney Fees: An Empirical Study of Public Company Con-
tracts, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 329 (2013). 
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prepare for initial public offerings ("IPOs"). 108 There 
are between the motives for adopting fee-shifting 
prov1s1ons and arguments that ultimately led the Supreme 
Court to Basie's presumption. Before comparing the rela-
and analyzing how fee-shifting can help solve some of 
the implications from Halliburton II, it would be helpful to lay a 
foundation for the application of fee-shifting provisions. 
B. a Foundation for a Strategic Defense 
The purpose of this section is to compare fee-shifting provisions 
with corporate contract provisions that affect litigation between a 
corporation and its shareholders. Corporate bylaws and articles 
are generally viewed as contractual relationships between the 
corporation and its shareholders. 109 As such, state corporation 
laws, specifically those in Delaware, generally allow broad discre-
tion on how corporations choose to operate.110 The two corporate 
contract provisions discussed below are forum-selection clauses 
and arbitration clauses. These provisions help lay a foundation 
fee-shifting provisions because of their method of adoption, 
the reasons behind their adoption, and their enforceability in cas-
es brought federal court. This section concludes with a federal 
preemption analysis, which naturally flows from the comparison 
of the other corporate contract provisions. 
1. Relationship to Forum-Selection Clauses 
Forum-selection clauses in a corporation's articles or bylaws 
require against the corporation to be brought in specific 
states and courts. Initially, such forum-selection provisions were 
not necessary since the internal affairs doctrine applied to corpo-
108. John C. Coffee, Jr_, Fee Shifting Bylaw and Charter Provisions: Can They Apply in 
Federal Court?-The Case for Preemption 1 (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Law and Econ. 
Studies, Working Paper No. 498, 2014) [hereinafter Coffee, The Case for Preemption], 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?Abstract_id=2508973. The difference 
between a bylaw adopted by the board of directors and a provi'sion contained in a corpora-
tion's articles will be discussed in Part ILB to provide context. 
109. See ATP Tour, 91 A3d at 558-
110. Donald F. Parsons, Jr_ & Joseph R Slights III, The History of Delaware's Business 
Courts: Their Rise to Preeminence, 17 Bus, L. TODAY 21, 23 (Mar.-Apr. 2008), The reason 
for pointing out Delaware is because the majority of Fortune 500 corporations choose to 
incorporate in the state_ Id. at 22. 
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111. Verity Winship, Shareholder Litigation by Contract 15 (Mar. 6, 2015) (un-
published manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2575668. 
112. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 302 cmt. g (1971). 
113. Winship, supra note 111, at 15-16. 
114. Id. at 16. 
115. In re Revlon, Inc. S'holders' Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 & n.8 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
116. See Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 956-57 (Del. 
Ch. 2013) (holding that forum-selection clauses unilaterally adopted by the board of direc-
tors were facially valid); City of Providence v. First Citizens Bancshares, Inc., 99 A.3d 229, 
242 (Del. Ch. 2014) (holding that a Delaware corporation can choose a forum other than 
Delaware in a forum-selection clause). 
117. 571 U.S._,_, 134 S. Ct. 568, 575 (2013). 
118. Id. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 579 (quoting Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 
33 (1988)) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
119. Id. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 575. 
120. Winship, supra note 111, at 12. 
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121. Id. at 11. 
122. Id. 
123. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 958 (DeL Ch. 
2013). 
124. Winship, supra note 111 at 10, 28-30. 
125. The SEC's registration requirements include disclosure of certain charter provi-
sions. See Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 8--9. Companies are incen-
tivized to disclose forum selection clauses because it will provide greater enforceability in 
court. See Paul Scrivano & Noah Kornblith, Exclusive Forum Bylaws: Further Considera-
tion Recommended, O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.omm.com/ex 
clusive-forum-bylaws-further-consideration-recommended-03-11-2014/. 
126. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2015) ("The bylaws may contain any provision, not 
inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of 
the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers 
of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees."). 
127. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 939. 
128. Id. 
129. See Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971); Winship, 
supra note 111, at 30. 
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contractual relationship between shareholders and the corpora-
purpose of forum-selection clauses is to consolidate mul-
ti-jurisdictional claims, which consequently lowers the net cost of 
such litigation. 130 The motive behind fee-shifting clauses, while 
slightly different, has the same net effect of lowering litigation 
costs for corporate defendants. 131 Fee-shifting clauses have and 
be adopted in the same manner as forum-selection clauses; 
is why the Delaware Supreme Court in ATP Tour held that 
fee-shifting provisions were facially valid. 132 Fee-shifting 
clauses, which seek to allocate "risk among parties in intra-
corporate litigation" govern the internal affairs of the corpora-
133 Forum-selection clauses simply affect the procedure of liti-
in no way affect the rights of shareholders to file 
claims against the corporation. However, under the theory that 
bylaws are contracts, should this allow corporations to essentially 
limit a shareholder's ability to file claims? 
2. Relationship to Arbitration Clauses 
clauses can be seen as a cousin to forum-selection 
clauses since such clauses require parties to resolve problems 
the public court system. 134 One important distinction 
regarding clauses is the legislative support of the 
Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), which favors arbitration. 135 Sev-
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States have 
the ability of courts to invalidate such clauses. In AT&T 
v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court stated, "The 
purpose' of the FAA is to 'ensur[e] that private arbitra-
agreements are enforced according to their terms."' 136 In 
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the Court held 
the FAA, a court cannot invalidate a contractual 
130. Winship, supra note 111, at 16. 
131. Id. at 52-53. 
132. See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 559-60 (Del. 2014). 
133. ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 558. 
134. See Winship, supra note 111, at 19. Compare this to forum selection clauses, 
which also "oustD" the otherwise default court from jurisdiction. Id. at 13. 
135. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1925) ("A written provision in ... a contract 
evidencing a transactio~ involving commerce to settle by arbitration ... shall be valid, ir-
revocable, and enforceable."). 
136. 563 U.S._,_, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (quoting Volt Info. Scis. v. Ed. of Trs., 
489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)). 
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waiver of class arbitration, because "the fact that it is not 
the expense involved proving a statutory remedy does not con-
stitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy."137 
discussing a conflict between the arbitration clause and 
antitrust laws, the Court held that antitrust laws did not guaran-
tee an "affordable" procedure to vindicate claims.138 In fact, 
tration clauses can be enforced for claims alleging violations 
federal securities laws. 139 While the FAA explicitly supports 
tration clauses, Verity Winship points out that these cases 
be understood as part of a movement towards a permissive atti-
tude to private ordering of procedure."140 
In applying the Court's analysis of arbitration clauses to fee-
shifting clauses, we can establish an indirect relationship. 
the FAA supports arbitration clauses, the PSLRA indirectly sup-
ports fee-shifting clauses.141 The purpose of Congress enacting the 
PSLRA was to cure abusive practices plaguing securities class ac-
tions.142 The PSLRA imposes sanctions for frivolous litigation by 
including a presumption in favor of awarding attorneys' fees for 
violations of FRCP Rule 11.143 Before the PSLRA, such awards 
were entirely at the court's discretion. 144 Now the courts are re-
quired to make a finding regarding compliance with FRCP Rule 
11; if the court finds non-compliance, mandatory sanctions are to 
be imposed. 145 By making these sanctions mandatory with a pre-
sumption of attorneys' fees and costs, Congress has essentially 
enacted legislation supporting fee-shifting. Analyzing a fee-
shifting clause under Italian Colors, fee-shifting clauses adopted 
either in a corporation's articles or bylaws are contracts. 146 Fur-
thermore, fee-shifting clauses do not eliminate a shareholder's 
137. 570 U.S._, _, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013). 
138. Id. at 2309. 
139. Cf Goldberg v. Bear, Sterns & Co., 912 F.2d 1418, 1420 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curi-
am) (affirming the lower court's decision that federal securities claims were not included 
in the parties' arbitration agreement, implying that, had they been, the securities claims 
would have been subject to arbitration as well). 
140. Winship, supra note 111, at 14. 
141. Goldberg, 912 F.2d at 1420; Rebalancing Litigation Risks, supra note 37, at 1009. 
142. Rebalancing Litigation Risks, supra note 37, at 1009-13. 
143. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c) (2012). 
144. See Rebalancing Litigation Risks, supra note 37, at 1016 . 
145. Id. 
146. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S._,_, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 
(2013). 
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147. Rebalancing Litigation Risks, supra note 37, at 1032. 
148. FED. R. Crv. P. ll(b)(2). Plaintiffs and plaintiffs attorneys are aware of the height-
ened pleading standards required in the PLSRA and that bringing a claim that is insuffi-
cient to pass, or is easily rebutted at, the class certification stage can be viewed as bring-
ing a speculative claim. Rebalancing Litigation Risks, supra note 37, at 1039. As with 
speculative claims, plaintiffs presume that the defendants are more likely to settle rather 
than attempt to defend the allegations. See id. at 1015. 
149. ATP Tour, Inc. v .. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 556 (Del. 2014). 
150. A decision on the enforceability of the fee-shifting bylaw in ATP Tour has not yet 
been handed down. Id. at 560. 
151. See, e.g., Rebalancing Litigation Risks, supra note 37, at 1047. 
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··~·~,, ..... ~.u •• ,u,"u to post a security 
fendant's reasonable 
152. Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 8. 
153. Id. at 3. 
154. 480 U.S. 1, 2 (1987). 
155. Id. at 2-3. The 10% penalty is calculated as 10% of the judgment. Id. at 3. 
156. Id. at 6-8. 
157. Id. at 8. 
158. Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 4; see FED. R. Crv. P. 11 (allow-
ing discretionary sanction for violations of Rule ll(b)). Coffee uses the term "discretionary" 
because it is the court's prerogative to issue sanctions based on the court's analysis of 
whether FRCP Rule ll(b) has been violated. See 15 U.S.C. § 78-u4(c)(2) (2012); Coffee, The 
Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 4. 
159. Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 4. 
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unsuccessful. 160 The Court reasoned that the state 
purely procedural nor did it conflict with the 
state law required a bond upfront, it still had the same effect as 
fee-shifting because the defendant would receive the if 
plaintiffs were unsuccessful. 162 The main difference between the 
bond requirement and a fee-shifting clause would the timing of 
putting up the money. 163 Coffee distinguishes Cohen from lOb-5 
claims on the grounds that: (1) Delaware has no substantive 
implementing fee-shifting; and (2) the holding from Cohen applies 
solely to derivative actions. 164 In contrast, lOb-5 class actions 
must be brought in federal court, which has exclusive subject 
matter jurisdiction over such claims.165 
But the fact still remains that bylaws are viewed as contracts 
under Delaware law, which can modify the American typi-
cally used by Delaware courts. 166 This leads back to an analysis 
under Atlantic Marine. Coffee notes that under 
fee-shifting provisions need to be consistent with 
54(d)(2) and 23(h), which deal with notice hearing require-
ments.167 It would not be a daunting task for corporate to 
include language that complied with these rules, as they are not 
restrictive. 168 Furthermore, Coffee argues that broad, one-sided 
fee-shifting conflicts with the policies enacted by Congress 
through the PSLRA. 169 Specifically, the PSLRA provides a "pre-
sumption" in favor of fee-shifting if the court finds a of 
FRCP Rule ll(b). 170 The same conflict arose 
road, with the Court pointing out the mandatory-versus-
discretionary language of the bylaws and 171 is 
160. 337 U.S. 541, 543, 557 (1949). 
161. Id. at 555-56. 
162. Id. at 544-45, 555. 
163. Compare id. at 545 (requiring a bond to be posted prior to the case), with Coffee, 
The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 6 (noting that fee-shifting requires payment of 
expenses after the case is complete). 
164. Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 12 n.13. 
165. Id. 
166. See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 558 (Del. 2014); Cof-
fee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 4. 
167. Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 5. 
168. See id. at 5-6 (explaining that FRCP Rules 54(d)(2) and 23(h) create minimal re-
strictions). 
169. Id. at 7-8. 
170. Id. at 8; see 15 U.S.C. § 78-u4(c) (2012). 
171. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 7 (1987). 
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next section, fee-shifting clauses, properly lim-
cases, should be upheld under Atlantic Marine. 
Forum-selection and arbitration clauses select "a decision mak-
er and a set of but do not change existing court proce-
dure."112 motives, method of adoption, and contractual rela-
between fee-shifting and forum-selection are almost 
identical. The relationship between fee-shifting and arbitration 
clauses is a little more indirect, in that there is federal law sup-
porting enforcement of arbitration clauses.173 One issue that re-
mams is whether federal courts will enforce fee-
shifting clauses. The remainder of this comment applies all the 
implications and analyses previously discussed to fee-shifting 
clauses specifically tailored to class action lOb-5 claims invoking 
the of reliance. This application shows how 
and federal courts should enforce fee-shifting clauses that 
are to presumption of reliance. 
LEVELS THE PLAYING FIELD FOR FRAUD-ON-THE-
MARKET 
The purpose of this section is to explain how and why fee-
clauses 
scribed 
prov1s10ns solve the implications of Halliburton II, 
I. The section looks at how tailored fee-shifting 
federal statutory scheme and case analysis de-
The discussion then looks at Halliburton Ifs 
potential effects on securities class action litigation. The section 
concludes on the endgame of implementing fee-shifting provisions 
and results are beneficial to both shareholders and cor-
porations. 
comment is strictly limited to lOb-5 class actions invoking 
presumption of reliance. 174 The reason behind apply-
ing fee-shifting clauses to this specific type of claim is so that 
such clauses hold up under judicial analysis, as previously 
172. Winship, supra note 111, at 19. 
173. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
174. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 250 (1988). As already mentioned, a dis-
cussion of the potential effects of broad, sweeping fee-shifting clauses, covering numerous 
types of potential claims, is outside the scope of this comment. For a more detailed discus-
sion on the broader scope of fee-shifting, see Winship, supra note 111, at 27-28; Sean J. 
Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Litigation by Shifting the 
Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2015). 
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discussed. 175 The solution presented this comment seeks to 
presumption, while at the same giving cor-
porate defendants an economic opportunity to rebut the presump-
Fee-shifting clauses will prompt defendants not to seek early 
settlement because it is more cost effective, instead to rebut 
the presumption. This will ultimately lead to a narrowing of the 
issues in such claims and also weed out frivolous cases by re-
quiring plaintiffs to file suits with sufficient merits. 176 Further-
more, such limited fee-shifting clauses help the circularity 
problem since cases will be less likely to settle and the sharehold-
ers not be merely transferring wealth one pocket to an-
other. The ultimate goal is the reduction the number of such 
have been empirically shown to destroy sharehold-
er wealth. 177 
LIMITED SCOPE AND ENFORCEABILITY OF FEE-SHIFTING 
PROVISIONS 
Much of the commentary on fee-shifting clauses discusses their 
use in terms of broad sweeping language and the consequences of 
such provisions. 178 Many of these arguments are why this com-
ment suggests fee-shifting clauses be narrowly tailored to the 
class certification stage of lOb-5 class actions invoking Basie's 
presumption reliance. Corporate attorneys draft fee-
shifting provisions as proposed here have to make sure the 
scope of these fee-shifting clauses specifically relate to such 
claims. The primary reason for sufficiently limiting the scope 
fee-shifting clauses is so they will stand up to judicial scruti-
ny and will provide a stronger case against preemption. 
As previously discussed, the PSLRA added language to the '34 
that creates a presumption of fee-shifting if the court finds a 
of FRCP Rule 1 179 A conflict arises because the lan-
guage provided by the PSLRA allows for two-way fee-shifting, 
while fee-shifting clauses would impose a mandatory one-way 
175. See supra Part II.B. 
176. These consequences of fee-shifting clauses fall in line with the policy reasons for 
Congress enacting the PSLRA. See supra Part LB. 
177. See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 8, at 4. 
178. See, e.g., Winship, supra note 111, at 5. 
179. Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 7-8; see 15 U.S.C. § 78-u4(c) 
(2012). 
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courts. 181 This ~~,,,,,,~ 
180. Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 8. 
181. Id. 
1347 
182. See In re Star Gas Sec. Litig., 745 F. Supp. 2d 26, 38-40 (D. Conn. 2010) (imposing 
fee-shifting on plaintiffs for filing frivolous securities fraud claims) . 
183. See Halliburton II, 573 U.S. _, _, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2416 (2014); see also supra 
Part I.C. 
184. Halliburton II, 573 U.S. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2416. 
185. See id. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2415. 
186. FED. R. CIV. P. ll(b)(3) (requiring that "the factual contentions [made to the court] 
have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary sup-
port after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery"); see, e.g., In re 
Star Gas Sec. Litig., 745 F. Supp. 2d at 36-37. 
187. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2)-(3); Winship, supra note 111, at 13. 
188. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
189. See supra Part II.B. 
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(mandatory shifting of fees from defendant corporation to plaintiff 
shareholders) does not indicate that the clause conflicts with the 
PSLRA. 190 The one-sided fee-shifting clause and the two-way 
mandatory sanctions of the PSLRA are not mutually exclusive. 
Furthermore, simply making fee-shifting mandatory on one party 
would not exclude the court from finding that a defendant violat-
ed FRCP Rule ll(b), and therefore requiring a defendant corpora-
tion to pay the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. 
Lastly, the language of such fee-shifting clauses should-and 
will likely have to-contain language regarding claims against 
clause itself. It only seems fair to not enforce fee-shifting 
clauses in claims alleging wrongdoing in the adoption of fee-
shifting clauses. Presumably, these claims will be derivative ac-
alleging a breach of duty by the board of directors who uni-
laterally adopted a fee-shifting bylaw. But since, as recommended 
above, the scope of a fee-shifting clause is limited to only lOb-5 
class actions, this should not be an issue in the first place. 191 
Proper limitations on the scope of fee-shifting clauses should 
allow such clauses to withstand judicial analysis similar to that 
which was applied to forum-selection and arbitration clauses. 
This is because there are readily apparent relationships between 
fee-shifting, forum-selection, and arbitration clauses. 192 Thus, it 
can be deduced that fee-shifting clauses applicable only to lOb-5 
class actions are supported by Congress and logically do not cre-
ate any dissonance with federal securities laws. The analysis of 
fee-shifting clauses does not end here, however. The effects of fee-
shifting will not only impact the wallets of parties involved 
lOb-5 class actions, but will also affect certain stages of litigation. 
Effects on Litigation 
of the main implications of Halliburton is that the deci-
will ultimately lead to a "battle of the experts" as both sides 
190. One-sided fee-shifting would enforce the mandatory sanctions of the PSLRA on 
the plaintiffs if they violated FRCP Rule ll(b) by insufficiently proving price impact, the 
foundation of FOM reliance. 
191. The scope of the fee-shifting clause will not cover breach of duty claims. 
192. See supra Part II.B (discussing the similarities between an arbitration clause and 
a fee-shifting clause). 
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vie over 
If the event studies conducted by the defendants' ~.,·~~··-+ 
to show a lack of price impact, the defendants 
but the FOM presumption at the class certification stage. 
the defendants' expectation recouping 
associated with price impact will 
ants against settlement. At the 
event studies showing price 
now presenting analyses each misrepresentation, 
193. See supra Part LC. Plaintiffs will attempt to prove price impact either indirectly 
or directly, and defendants will attempt to directly prove a lack of price impact. 
194. Halliburton II, 573 U.S._,_, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2417 (2014). 
195. See supra Part LC. 
196. See Streett & Pennington, supra note 72, at 4 (predicting that the class certifica-
tion stage will become a battle of the experts). 
197. See id. This is assuming that the plaintiff class alleges that the corporation made 
multiple misrepresentations. 
198. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text. 
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to consider 
class. 
more evidence determining whether 
event studies conducted by the defendants' ex-
the 
Assuming plaintiffs use this leverage to obtain a higher 
settlement amount based on event studies produced by the plain-
experts, a can simply compare the size of the price 
settlement amount. 200 However, the high frequency 
of settlement has been identified as one of the major issues con-
cerning securities class actions due to inadequate compensa-
201 The of inadequate settlement awards is one of the 
class action litigation destroys share-
to note that class action settle-
ments approval. 203 However, the problem is that 
judges not enough evidence front of them to 
decide a amount is 204 A detailed explana-
of the settlement analysis is outside the scope of this com-
199. See supra Part LC. 
the analysis "amount[s] to asking only 
rough justice to the claim."206 The incen-
200. If the settlement award is too low, the judge will also be able to use the event 
studies to ascertain an equitable settlement award. 
201. U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 8, at 5-6. 
202. See id. at 6. Plaintiffs attorneys usually take a substantial percentage of any set-
tlement award before distributions are paid to the plaintiff class. Id. at 5. 
203. Griffith, supra note 174, at 19. 
204. See id. at 20. 
205. For a more thorough analysis, see generally id. at 19-25. 
206. Id. at 20. 
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have to reconcile any 
on Ultimately, judges 
into the merits of claim. 
B. 
fee-shifting clauses comment is 
affecting securities litigation. 
on plaintiffs will incentivize to 
better evidence. If 
Fee-shifting clauses are intended to deter 
less claims. obvious consequence of a fee-shifting clause is 
that it puts plaintiffs in the situation that corporations currently 
face: paying the fees sides. 208 This potential on 
act as a fee-shifting clause will force 
to bring that they know or reasonably believe 
survive class certification, to avoid paying defendants' at-
torneys' fees. 209 deterrence is the main purpose of fee-
shifting clauses, the limited scope of the clauses proposed this 
comment will not completely eliminate securities class action 
suits; the on plaintiffs will simply weed out 
speculative The effects fee-shifting clauses could even 
potentially the plaintiffs. One potential benefit is that the 
207. See supra Part III. 
208. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Solution, supra note 106. 
209. See Greene, supra note 64; Liz Hoffman, Shareholder Suits May Prove Costly: Rul-
ing Upholds Bylaw Requiring Loser to Pay Winner's Legal Fees, WALL ST. J. (May 18, 
2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304908304579565850165670972. 
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plaintiff class is more likely to succeed at trial on the merits since 
class certification will require stronger proof of price impact. 210 
By requiring plaintiffs who cannot make it past the class certi-
fication state to pay the corporation's attorneys' fees, the circular-
ity problem is diminished. As noted previously, the problem of 
circularity arises because shareholders receive any settlement 
amount from a defendant corporation. 211 Since shareholders are 
the investors in a corporation, any amount paid by the corpora-
tion decreases the value of the corporation. 212 If a defendant is 
able to prove a lack of price impact and the court decides not to 
certify the class, this is the end of the class action suit. At this 
point, assuming a district court applies the American Rule, the 
shareholders will still see a decrease in the value of their invest-
ment in the corporation. This is because the corporation incurred 
substantial litigation costs. While under the American Rule, the 
plaintiff class will have to pay their own litigation costs, so the 
costs to the corporation are not doubled. 213 However, by adopting a 
fee-shifting clause, defendants would be able to recover their liti-
gation costs and thus restore shareholder value. 
Several possible outcomes are likely to occur if a corporation 
can stop a claim at the certification stage. One outcome is that 
the parties will enter into settlement agreements favoring 
corporation.214 This assumes the settlement agreement not 
require the corporation to pay the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. The 
other outcome is that the corporation will move to recover fees ac-
cording to its fee-shifting clause. Again, the corporation will not 
be paying the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. Because corporations 
not have to incur the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, and recover 
their litigation costs, shareholder value is restored. The effect of 
210. See Frankel, supra note 64. 
211. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
212. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. This is assuming the shareholders of 
the plaintiff class remain shareholders of the corporation from the beginning of the class 
period through the payment of the settlement. As noted earlier, shareholder wealth can 
further decline if the shareholders of the plaintiff class differ from the current sharehold-
ers. U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 42, at 6. 
213. Griffith, supra note 174, at 6. 
214. A settlement favoring the corporation can take on numerous forms. For example, 
the settlement agreement could require the corporation to pay nothing. At the very least 
corporations will likely push for an agreement that does not require them to pay the plain-
tiffs attorneys' fees. See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 8, at 19 (not-
ing that on average, plaintiffs' attorneys' fees were 18% of the settlement). 
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fee-shifting clauses does impose a heavy burden on plaintiffs if 
are to certify as class. However, this heavy burden 
seems necessary due to the ineffectiveness of current deterrence 
methods. 215 
is worth mentioning that the problem of circularity is not re-
solved by fee-shifting clauses if the defendant is not able to defeat 
class certification. In addressing this concern, fee-shifting clauses 
also deter corporations from settlement in cases based on 
speculative allegations since they will have a higher probability of 
rebutting price impact. As noted earlier, the problems with cur-
rent settlement agreements are the root of the circularity problem 
inadequate consideration.216 As more cases move on to trial, 
awarding of attorneys' fees is left to the courts. This is be-
cause the scope of the fee-shifting clauses proposed by this com-
ment does not cover decisions reached on the merits. The type of 
fee-shifting clauses proposed here will only require plaintiffs to 
reimburse the defendant if they fail to certify as a class. 
Corporations that adopt such clauses clearly seek to deter 
securities litigation. By adopting a fee-shifting clause, 
corporations will set up a defensive strategy that provides several 
benefits. First, the amount of claims brought against the corpora-
tion will decrease. This is because speculative claims are less like-
to be brought as plaintiffs consider the potential burden of a 
fee-shifting clause. Second, even if claims are brought, defendants 
are now incentivized to rebut price impact. If successful, the de-
'-'-"-'-'A<.U'-'"' will recover their litigation costs and the shareholders' 
investments will be restored. 
IMPLICATIONS OF FEE-SHIFTING PROVISIONS 
The adoption fee-shifting clauses tailored to lOb-5 class ac-
tions will cause a substantial change in current securities litiga-
The purpose of this section is to identify several apparent 
implications for corporations adopting fee-shifting clauses. While 
the scope of this comment is limited to lOb-5 class actions, the 
commentary on the future of fee-shifting clauses has primarily fo-
cused on broad fee-shifting clauses. However, any action taken 
215. See Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Solution, supra note 106. 
216. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text. 
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217. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text. At the time of this writing, the 
Delaware legislature had tabled discussions of fee-shifting clauses until early 2015. See 
Rickard, supra note 1. 
218. See Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 1. There are already a 
growing number of companies adopting such bylaws, and support from the Delaware legis-
lature will give the go-ahead to any corporations currently on the fence about fee-shifting 
bylaws. Id. 
219. See id. 
220. Id. at 2. 
221. Claims will likely be brought as a breach of duty by the board of directors. See Jeff 
C. Dodd & James Edward Maloney, Delaware Supreme Court Finds Fee-Shifting Bylaw 
Permissible, ANDREWSKURTH (May 15, 2014), http://www.andrewskurth.com/assets/pdf/ 
article_1074.pdf. ' 
222. Presumably courts will apply the ATP Tour analysis. See supra Part II.A 
223. See Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 2. 
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224. Kevin LaCroix, Oklahoma Legislature Adopts Derivative Litigation Fee-Shifting 
Provision, D&O DIARY (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.dandodiary.com/2014/09/articles/corpo 
rate-governance/oklahoma-legislature-adopts-derivative-litigation-fee-shifting-provision/. 
LaCroix points out that the Oklahoma bill is much narrower than the fee-shifting bylaw 
approved by the Delaware Supreme Court. Id. 
225. Id. 
226. The revenue generated by incorporation fees and franchise taxes has the ability to 
comprise 30% of Delaware's budget. Delaware lawyers have a substantial influence over 
the state legislature. See Bainbridge, Public Choice Lens, supra note 101. 
227. See Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 2; see also supra Part N. 
228. See supra text accompanying notes 39-49, 139-45. 
229. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Solution, supra note 106. 
230. Id. (citing Stephen J. Choi, Assessing the Cost of Regulatory Protections: Evidence 
on the Decision to Sell Securities Outside the United States 4 (Yale Law & Econ., Research 
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companies to move back overseas al-
so creates a strong: for foreign companies to 
with the empirical 
system securities litigation 
of shareholder wealth, 232 should provide 
Congress to seriously consider reform. 
measures taken on the extreme ends of the spectrum 
cause more good. For example, a complete 
on fee-shifting clauses will, at a minimum, allow current 
action full support broad fee-
related to securities litigation, on the other 
to severely limit securities class actions, 
. f d l . 234 anti- rau regu at1on. 
These · concerns should signal to the SEC that 
fee-shifting clauses should be given serious consid-
testifying to the SEC Investor Advisory Commit-
out potential actions that the SEC could 
clauses. 235 First, the SEC, as amicus curiae, 
in cases with no FRCP Rule 11 
SEC could refuse to accelerate registra-
companies a fee-shifting clause in 
the SEC could companies to 
registration forms that fee-shifting clauses 
securities laws. 238 Lastly, the SEC could re-
fee-shifting clauses as a major "risk fac-
uu;cu::;::;i11~ these potential actions, Coffee also provides 
Paper No. 253, Mar. 21, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=267506). 
231. See id. (citing MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & CHARLES E. SCHUMER, SUSTAINING NEW 
YORK'S AND THE US' GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 75, 77 (2007); Howell E. 
Jackson, Summary of Research Findings on Extra-Territorial Application of Federal Secu-
rities Law, in GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS & THE U.S. SECURITIES LAWS 2009: STRATEGIES 
FOR THE CHANGING REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 1243, 1253-54 (Practicing Law Inst. 
2009)). 
232. See id.; U.S. CHALV!BER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 8, at 5-6. 
233. See supra note 223 and accompanying text (describing the possible effects of a 
complete ban in Delaware). 
234. See Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Solution, supra note 106 (describing how cur-
rent securities litigation deters fraud). 
235. Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 8-9. 
236. Id. at 8. 
237. Id. 
238. Id. at 9. 
239. Id. 
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insight their shortcomings. 
disclosures, is 
crease in the value of a company's 
shifting clause, because not 
porate insiders breaching their fiduciary 
fee's testimony, the SEC could also take this 
and fix current problems with securities litigation. 
effective solution by the SEC will attempt to 
um between the extreme ends of the 
the SEC's best interest to get out in 
frontation of fee-shifting clauses. Establishing 
debate will help avoid landing on either of 
the spectrum. 
The enforceability fee-shifting clauses 
make substantial changes to securities class 
of these clauses have fueled a strong 
appropriateness in the corporate world. 241 
seems imminent as more and more corporations 
adopt fee-shifting clauses into · articles or 
there is not a simple yes or no answer as to 
clauses should be allowed. Legislatures and 
will need to take into consideration the 
their actions. Ideally, as this comment suggests, 
the SEC will be able to find a happy medium 
shifting clauses in limited situations, 
solving the current problems of securities 
This comment lays out a framework that should 
tions to strategically defend themselves against 
meritless lOb-5 class action suits invoking Basie's 
tion of reliance. After Halliburton corporate 
able to rebut a plaintiffs' presumption 
class certification stage by offering evidence 
misrepresentations did not cause a 
240. Id. at 9. 
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241. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text (explaining the debate currently 
facing Delaware legislature regarding whether or not to prohibit fee-shifting clauses). 
242. See Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 1. 
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243. Halliburton II, 573 U.S._,_, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2417 (2014). 
244. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text. 
245. See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 8, at 4. 
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